Lausanne Articles 37–45 on Minorities: What the 1923 Treaty Guarantees and What It Does Not

Why It Matters

What does the Treaty of Lausanne say about minorities and borders? In Section III (Articles 37–45) Türkiye undertook to protect the life, liberty, legal equality and communal institutions of its non-Muslim nationals, and elsewhere the treaty fixed the frontiers of the new state in place of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. Read together with the Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921, it is the foundation of Türkiye's internationally recognized borders.

The protections rest on equal citizenship, not on territorial or political autonomy for any group. That distinction explains most of the disagreement over what Lausanne 'guarantees' and what it does not.

Background

From Sèvres to Lausanne

The Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920, under Allied occupation. It envisaged an Armenian state (Articles 88–93, with a boundary later drawn in the arbitral award of US President Woodrow Wilson on 22 November 1920), a possible Kurdish autonomy scheme (Articles 62–64), and extensive foreign control. It was never ratified. The Grand National Assembly in Ankara rejected it and fought the War of Independence, which led to the Mudanya Armistice (11 October 1922).

The Lausanne Conference met in two phases, from November 1922 to February 1923 and again from April to July 1923. The Turkish delegation was led by İsmet İnönü. The treaty was signed on 24 July 1923 by Türkiye on one side and the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the other. It entered into force on 6 August 1924. The Republic had been proclaimed on 29 October 1923.

The frontier settlement

Lausanne's Articles 2 and 3 define Türkiye's frontiers, including the Thrace line along the Maritsa/Meriç river and the Syrian border by reference to the 1921 Franco-Turkish Agreement of Ankara. The Iraq line was left to later arrangement and settled by the 1926 Ankara Treaty. In Article 16 Türkiye renounced rights over territories outside the treaty frontiers. Articles 20–21 recognized the British annexation of Cyprus, a point to which later Cyprus settlements, including the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, refer back.

In the east, the frontier was not drawn at Lausanne but inherited from earlier instruments:

• Gümrü/Alexandropol (2–3 December 1920), between the Grand National Assembly government and the First Republic of Armenia.
• Moscow (16 March 1921), between Ankara and Soviet Russia.
• Kars (13 October 1921), between Ankara and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, confirming the Moscow line.

The sister publication Archive of Nations covers this sequence in its fact check on whether Sèvres is still valid, with Lausanne, Kars and the treaty record. Our own treatment is in Fact Check: Is the Treaty of Sèvres Still Valid, and Can It Support Claims Against Türkiye?.

Section III, article by article

Article	What it provides (summarized from the treaty text)
37	Türkiye recognizes Articles 38–44 as fundamental laws; no law, regulation or official action may conflict with or override them.
38	Full protection of life and liberty for all inhabitants without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion; free exercise of any creed whose practice is not inconsistent with public order and good morals.
39	Non-Muslim nationals enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims; equality before the law; no restriction on the free use of any language in private dealings, commerce, religion, the press, publications or public meetings; facilities for oral use of other languages before courts.
40	Same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals; equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions and schools, with their own language and religion.
41	Primary-school instruction in the child's own language in towns and districts with a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals, with Turkish remaining compulsory; an equitable share of public funds for education, religious and charitable purposes.
42	Family law and personal status may be settled according to the customs of the minorities; protection of churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious establishments.
43	No obligation to perform acts violating faith or religious observance; no penalty for refusing to attend court or conduct legal business on a weekly day of rest.
44	The provisions are obligations of international concern, placed under League of Nations guarantee; modification required assent of a majority of the League Council; disputes could be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
45	The same rights are conferred by Greece on the Muslim minority in its territory (reciprocity).

Two features matter for interpretation. First, the operative rights belong to 'Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities', which ties the regime to citizenship. Second, the treaty does not list communities by name. In Turkish practice the regime has been applied to the Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish communities. Some other communities, notably Syriac Orthodox Christians, argue that the text's general wording should cover them too.

The companion Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (30 January 1923) was a separate instrument. It compelled a large population exchange but exempted the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul and the Muslims of Western Thrace, which is why those two groups became the practical subjects of the minority regime in each country.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye

Türkiye treats Lausanne as the founding international settlement of the Republic and as final on borders and status. It reads Articles 37–45 as a regime of equal citizenship, rooted in the Constitution's principle of equality before the law (Article 10) and its civic definition of citizenship (Article 66). The supporting official sources are the treaty text itself and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa.gov.tr) pages and statements on Lausanne and on Armenia.

Greece and Greek commentators

Athens relies on Lausanne for its Thrace and Aegean settlement, and Greek commentators frequently cite Articles 37–45 in two ways. First, they argue that the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its institutions have not been given the full protection of Articles 38–42. They point to the 6–7 September 1955 Istanbul riots, the 1964 expulsion of Greek nationals, the closure of the Halki seminary in 1971, and long-running property disputes. Second, Greece defends its own record on the Muslim minority of Western Thrace, which it describes in the treaty's wording as a 'Muslim minority' that includes Turks, Pomaks and Roma. Ankara and Western Thrace Turkish organizations insist on the term 'Turkish minority'. Türkiye also points to foundation-law reforms in 2008 and 2011 as steps on property restitution.

Armenian diaspora organizations and Armenia

Some Armenian diaspora organizations argue that Lausanne, unlike Sèvres, never mentions Armenians, and that the Armenian Question was removed from the diplomatic agenda together with a declaration of amnesty. They see this as the moment justice for the events of 1915 was set aside. A few groups, particularly those linked to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, treat the Wilson arbitral award as a continuing legal or moral reference point.

The Republic of Armenia is a distinct actor. It was not a Lausanne party. In the unratified Zurich Protocols of 10 October 2009, Türkiye and Armenia confirmed mutual recognition of the existing border 'as defined by relevant treaties of international law'. Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence, which refers to the 'Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia', is cited by Ankara as a lingering territorial ambiguity. Yerevan has not treated the border as open to claims in the current normalization talks.

Other treaty-based views

The British, French and other signatories no longer supervise the regime. Article 44 gave the League of Nations Council the oversight role; the League was dissolved in 1946. Legal commentators disagree on how much of that guarantee survives, though no one argues the substantive obligations were extinguished by Türkiye's own change of constitutional order. The Vienna Convention Articles 31–32 guide sets out the interpretive method we apply to such questions: ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose.

Türkiye's Legal Stance

Türkiye's Legal Stance (attributed to Turkish official positions; verify on mfa.gov.tr and the treaty text)

• Lausanne is final and not open to renegotiation. Ankara argues that the treaty settled the post-war order in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, and that its frontier provisions, together with Moscow and Kars, are binding treaty law. This view is stated in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' public materials marking the treaty's centenary in 2023.
• Sèvres is a dead instrument. Ankara holds that Sèvres was never ratified, never entered into force, and was superseded by Lausanne, so it cannot generate territorial or legal claims. See our Sèvres fact check.
• Minority protection is equal citizenship, not separate status. According to the Turkish position, Articles 37–45 guarantee non-Muslim nationals equality in law and in fact, and their own institutions, which are exercised within the Constitution's Article 10 equality clause and the Article 66 civic definition of 'Turk'.
• The eastern border is confirmed by Kars, and the 2009 protocols endorse it. The Turkish Foreign Ministry's Armenia materials refer to the treaties of Moscow and Kars as the border instruments and to the 2009 text on the 'existing border'. In the normalization process begun on 14 January 2022 by Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan, Ankara describes its approach as normalization without preconditions.
• History belongs to historians. Türkiye rejects parliamentary verdicts on the Events of 1915 and proposed in 2005 an independent joint historical commission with full archive access. Whether the 1948 Convention applies is tested in our Genocide Convention guide, which covers Article II intent, Article IX jurisdiction and non-retroactivity.

The legal basis: the Lausanne text itself (Articles 2–3, 16, 37–45), the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, the general rule that a treaty in force binds its parties, and the principle that unratified instruments create no obligations.

Source Comparison

Question	Common framing in diaspora, Greek or Western commentary	Turkish primary-source framing	What the text shows
Does Lausanne erase Armenian claims?	It 'buried' the Armenian Question by omission and amnesty.	Lausanne and Kars settled borders; claims have no treaty basis.	Armenia is not named; borders are confirmed by Lausanne, Moscow and Kars.
Is Sèvres still a reference point?	Wilson's award remains morally or legally significant.	Sèvres was never ratified and was superseded.	Lausanne replaced Sèvres; Sèvres never entered into force.
Were Articles 37–45 fully implemented?	Property, schooling and clergy training show gaps for Greek Orthodox and others.	Equal citizenship applies; reforms such as the 2008 and 2011 foundation measures show progress.	The text sets standards, but practice is contested, and the League supervision is gone.
Who is a 'minority'?	Wider groups, including Syriacs, should be covered.	Only the three communities are Lausanne minorities in Turkish practice.	The text says 'non-Muslim minorities' without a list.
Reciprocity	Often ignored.	Stressed in relation to Western Thrace.	Article 45 makes the regime mutual.

The fairest reading holds both facts in view: the treaty is clear on borders and finality, and the implementation record in Article 38–42 areas is legitimately debated. Our Editorial Principles explain how we separate such documentary points from attributed positions.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Non-Muslim minorities: the category used in Articles 37–45; the text gives no list of communities.
• Equal citizenship: the organizing principle of Article 39, which grants the same civil and political rights as Muslim nationals.
• League guarantee (Article 44): the League Council's supervisory role, which ended with the League's dissolution in 1946.
• Reciprocity (Article 45): Greece's matching obligation toward its Muslim minority.
• Treaty of Kars (1921): the border treaty with the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, confirming the Moscow line.
• Unratified treaty: an instrument such as Sèvres that creates no binding obligation for a state that never ratified it.

Related reading: Is the Treaty of Sèvres still valid?; the 1948 Genocide Convention against the Events of 1915; Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; and, from our sister publications, The Political Anatomy on the Cyprus issue and the 1960 treaties.

Perspective Note

Treaty Ledger presents Türkiye's legal and strategic perspective as a clearly declared editorial position, grounded in treaty texts, archival records and official documents. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify every claim independently. Treaty Ledger presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Legal Stance' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.